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THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN PRIVATE PROPERTY
RIGHTS
JAMES L. HUFFMAN*
Notwithstanding a few recent victories in the courts and the emergence of a
national, grassroots property rights movement, property rights advocates are on the
defensive. It has been this way at least since the New Deal. Indeed, it probably has
been this way for time immemorial. And it will always be thus, at least so long as
private property survives. And private property will always survive, even if battered
and scarred, because private property, in the most basic sense, is unavoidable.
I am, in a very real sense, the owner of this podium at the moment. My
leasehold, so to speak, is of limited duration and presumably subject to termination
by the moderator for good cause, but for now it is mine in the not insignificant
sense that the right to speak has been assigned to me pursuant to a set of rules or
customs which at least most of us have accepted. If speech is to have any value in
a room full of people, it must be done pursuant to rules which permit one person
to speak while others listen. The opportunity to speak in a room full of people,
particularly a room full of lawyers and philosophers, is a scarce resource and, for
better or worse, I am the owner of that resource for the next while.
The same might be said of the food that each of us will have for lunch today. Let
us assume that our lunch will be served buffet style and thus will be the property
of none of us or, if you prefer, of all of us when we arrive to fill our plates. But
when I fill my plate, the custom in our society holds that it is mine. I have captured
it, to draw an analogy to the law of ownership in wild game. And if you reject this
assertion, which at least a few of you will because of my reference to what some
consider the immoral concept of ownership of wild game, no one, I assume, will
disagree that when I ingest the food from my plate, it has become indisputably
mine.
I offer these homely examples to confirm that property, in the sense of
entitlement to the exclusion of others, is inevitable, even if we insist that everything
belongs to the community, to nature, to God or to no one. In the Soviet Union,
where private property existed only in memories of a bourgeois past, everything that
was produced and all of the services that were provided were ultimately of benefit
to some and of no benefit to others. The beneficiaries were the owners, in the most
meaningful sense of that term, of those goods and services; a fact to which those
who did not benefit could offer persuasive testimony if not the evidence of personal
deprivation. Not surprisingly those who benefitted most - the wealthiest property
owners in the pragmatic sense in which I am using the term - were invariably
those who purported to act for the community or who had ingratiated themselves
to these public officials.
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And so it is with virtually everything which people value because one person's
enjoyment of a scarce commodity or service is always dependent upon the exclusion
or restraint of others. For example my enjoyment of the spectacular views of the
Grand Canyon depends upon constraints on those who would pollute the air or
construct buildings on the rim, and the extent of my enjoyment depends upon
limiting the access of others whose desire to enjoy the view creates congestion and
thus diminishes my enjoyment. We might say that the Grand Canyon belongs to all
of us, but the truth is that those of us who value it for its scenic splendor take
precedence over those who value it as a marvelous reservoir site. We nature buffs
have, again in the pragmatic sense I have been using, a property interest, if we are
willing to pay the entrance fee, while others are excluded from using the canyon for
non-permitted purposes.
I imagine it will be objected that my last example is different since everyone
owns the park for scenic purposes and no one owns it for precluded purposes, but
that is not the case with many scenic places and will surely not always be the case
with the Grand Canyon. The day has come in some of our parks and on many of
our rivers when we choose to limit access even among those who seek only to
enjoy nature's wonders. When I am precluded from floating down the Colorado
River as it courses through the Grand Canyon because I have no permit, those who
do have permits own the river at that time and for that purpose, and their enjoyment
depends upon my exclusion. Even where it is true that everyone owns a resource
for a particular purpose, it is an ownership of no significance to those who do not
value the designated purpose.
So property in scarce resources is inevitable.' It would seem to be in the nature
of things. That property is in the nature of things does not necessarily mean that it
is a morally superior social custom or institution. But there is a persuasive moral
case to be made for the legal recognition and protection of private property rights.
John Locke wrote at length and with great insight on property as the fundamental
among all of the natural rights!
Why, then, are property rights advocates usually on the defensive? Because those
who are excluded invariably outnumber those with the right to use or enjoy a
particular resource. Property owners are thus easily cast as selfish individualists,
while those who are excluded assume the comfortable mantel of the public interest
in their efforts to influence the use of resources in which others possess property
rights. The case for a public interest in the creation and protection of property rights
is not easily made to those who anticipate that they will benefit from governments'
interventions. The prospect of getting something for nothing is too much to resist
for most self-interested advocates of the public interest.
3
1. See James L. Huffman, The Inevitability of Private Rights in Public Lands, 65 U. COLO. L. REV.
241, 270-72 (1994).
2. See JOHN LOCKJE., Of Property, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 303, 303-31 (Peter Laslett
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690).
3. The allure of government-provided benefits is all the stronger because the costs of specific
government action are hidden in the citizens' general tax bills.
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So the claims of private property owners are often seen as obstacles to the pursuit
of the public interest. The debate tends to pit self-interest against the public interest.
Never mind that those who advocate for a particular version of the public interest
will usually benefit personally from its realization. This is not to say that public
interest advocates do not sincerely believe that the objectives they champion are
good for the public. But it is the rare individual who does not value personally the
ends he or she urges as in the public interest. Defenders of private property rights,
which by definition are personal as opposed to community rights, have nothing to
stand upon but self-interest and abstract theories about efficient resource allocation.4
The natural rights defense of private property carries little weight in a society of
moral relativism and constitutional balancing.5
In a political culture which values a simplistic notion of democracy over liberty,6
property rights advocates will never occupy the moral high ground. Property rights
are expressions of liberty. Liberty is individual autonomy. Private property is
therefore a constraint on the pursuit and realization of the public interest as defined
in a majoritarian democracy. Indeed, a central purpose of the constitutional
protection of private property is to constrain the majority in the use of its coercive
powers to redistribute wealth.
While secure private property rights are critical to the efficient allocation of
scarce resources and most of our regulations purport to improve upon those
efficiencies by internalizing external costs,7 our public debates about private
property are largely about the distribution of wealth - the distribution of the costs
and benefits of using the planet's scarce resources! The most common objections
to private property are that those who possess property rights are not deserving in
some sense,9 and that market allocations of scarce resources have undesirable
4. The efficiency arguments have been widely propounded, see, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 27-64 (2d ed. 1977), but often with little apparent influence on those who
would prefer to redistribute the wealth inherent in existing property rights.
5. Although natural rights theory was widely accepted at the time of the adoption of the United
States Constitution, it has been given little credence in modem America where morality is in the eye of
the beholder and the Supreme Court has resorted to balancing as the measure of virtually every individual
right.
6. Many, if not most, Americans have come to understand that democratic government is the
underlying value of the Constitution. This perspective is reflected in an appeal to democracy whenever
government action conflicts with claims of individual right. The Constitutional framers had a very
different perspective on democratic government. For them it was the least worst form of government in
a society where the promotion and protection of individual liberty was the motivating reason for the
founding of governments. See MARTIN DIAMOND, THE DECLARATION AND THE CONSTIrUTION: LIBERTY,
DEMOCRACY AND THE FOUNDERS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 39-55 (1976).
7. See James Buchanan & William Stubblebine, Externality, 29 ECONOMICA 371 (1962).
8. Standard economic analysis distinguishes between resource allocation, which has to do with the
uses to which resources are put, and wealth distribution, which has to do with who bears the costs and
realizes the benefits arising from particular resource allocations. The former can be evaluated in terms
of efficiency, by which the economist means the maximization of net social welfare. The latter can be
evaluated in terms of fairness, desert, justice and other such measures of relative wealth.
9. For example, it might be objected that the current assignments of property rights are the result
of an illegal or otherwise objectionable initial distribution or subsequent acquisition of those rights.
1997]
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wealth distribution consequences. Depending on one's standards of dessert and
desirability, these claims may be true, but they are not relevant to the economic
efficiency of private property and markets.
Of course, if we do not care about efficient resource allocation, this aspect of my
defense of private property is not persuasive. But if one believes the rhetoric of
both political and academic debates about regulatory policy,"0 it is clear that
efficiency does matter and that the regulatory system is designed to improve
efficiency by the internalization of costs."
Sometimes the regulatory system is used for the express purpose of redistributing
wealth which can only be accomplished by transfers from some individuals to
others. When those transfers impact on property rights, most will agree that the
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution becomes relevant." But most
wealth transfers are accomplished inadvertently or under the guise of cost
internalization. 3 There is no principled reason to conclude that the 5th Amendment
is less relevant under these circumstances.
From the very beginning of organized governments, wealth has been freely and
often massively redistributed in the name of the public interest. In a world where
democracy is the most treasured goal of political systems, wealth distribution will
depend upon the distribution of political power. Even in an ideal democratic
political system where every individual has equal influence, wealth will be regularly
redistributed as different interests are able to achieve majority status. Markets will
not work under these conditions unless private property exists in some form. To the
extent that private property does exist, it necessarily functions as a restraint on the
ability of the majority to redistribute wealth. The Fifth Amendment takings clause
is a recognition of this fact.
The point of a private property system is to constrain the ability of individuals
and governments to redistribute wealth. In this sense private property is a limit on
the power of democratic government. From the perspective of natural rights, this
limit on democratic power reflects the preexisting rights of individuals which exist
independent from the will of government. From the perspective of legal positivism,
this limit reflects a social preference for the efficiencies of free markets which are
10. For an in-depth analysis of one of the early policy debates over pollution, see JAMES E. KRIER
& EDMOND URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY: A CASE ESSAY ON CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL EXPERIENCE
wrrT MOTOR VEHICLE AIR POLLUTION 17-37 (1977).
11. The efficiency theory assumes that market participants bear the full costs of their activities.
When those costs are "externalized" to third parties, there is a market failure in the sense that one of the
assumed conditions of an efficient market is missing. In such cases, regulations may be designed to
internalize the full costs to the decision maker.
12. U.S. CONST. amrend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.").
13. Few, if any, regulations are without unintended consequences in the form of costs and benefits.
For example, zoning regulations almost invariably have the effect of increasing the value of some
properties and decreasing the value of others. This provides an incentive for property owners and others
to seek influence over zcning decisions as a way of improving their personal situation. Because it is
seldom acceptable to argue for public action to improve one's personal welfare, parties seeking such
results will contend for that public policy situation most likely to improve their personal circumstances.
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dependent upon secure and transferable private rights. But from the perspective of
modem democrats (with a small d), private property is a limit on the realization of
the fundamental value of majority rule, and the 5th Amendment's takings clause is
an unfortunate obstacle to government's pursuit of the public interest.
The framers of the American Constitution understood both the natural rights and
the positivist arguments for private property. They were well instructed in the
natural rights philosophy of John Locke. They believed, as articulated in the
Declaration of Independence, that individuals are endowed with inalienable rights.
Their experience under the Articles of Confederation led them to insist upon the
inclusion of a bill of rights in a new constitution,"4 but a bill of rights which
derived its content from the nature of things, not from the constitution, the
democratic will or the government. 5 Property was understood to be an inevitable
consequence of human enterprise and a necessity for the fulfillment of human
potential.
The framers of the Constitution also understood that without private property, the
abundant resources of their continent would suffer the fate which Garret Hardin
would, many years later, describe as the tragedy of the commons." Without secure
and transferable property rights, resources would be allocated according to the whim
of the self-interested thief or the well-intentioned representative of the democratic
majority. In neither case would there exist the incentives requisite to wise use of
scarce resources. The framers understood in their own way that a tragedy of the
commons results from the individual's recognition that resources not consumed
today will almost surely be consumed by someone else in the future.
But we have long since abandoned the framer's vision for our Constitution. What
was once a libertarian constitution reliant on a carefully limited democracy as the
least worst form of government 7 has become a democratic constitution under
which liberty claims are balanced against the will of the majority." Private
property, though expressly guaranteed against public invasion in the Fifth
Amendment, has, until recently, carried little weight on the Supreme Court's
constitutional scales. The very idea of balancing condemns the private property
14. See generally WILLIAM ,VINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLrnCS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISToRY
OF THE UNITED STATES (1953) (discussing the development of the Constitution).
15. This understanding is consistent with the original decision not to include a bill of rights in the
proposed Constitution for fear that an attempt to enumerate individual rights would imply that other
rights did not exist independent from the positive law of the Constitution.
16. See Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
17. See DIAMOND, supra note 6, at 39-55.
18. For example, a claimant under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause must demonstrate that
regulation goes "too far" to prove a regulatory taking. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,
415 (1922).
19. From the Pennsylvania Coal decision in 1922 until its 1987 decisions in Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) and First Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987),
the Supreme Court had been witness to the gradual evisceration of the Takings Clause as a meaningful
protection of property rights. Since 1987, the Supreme Court has decided a small handful of other cases
favorable to the property owner. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
1997]
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claimant or defender to urging that self-interest outweighs the public interest. The
property owner can seldom occupy the moral high ground when the issue is framed
in these terms.
Environmental regulation has brought the property rights issue to the forefront
because of the pervasive if sometimes subtle effects of these regulations on ordinary
people." Grassroots property rights organizations have emerged across the country
and have beenable to influence the political debate at both the state and federal
level." Combined with a few federal court decisions which have breathed new life
into the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause,' these developments have given hope
to property rights advocates. Unfortunately, the irresistible temptations of expansive
governmental powers lead to ever new burdens on property owners, while their
arguments in defensE of their constitutional rights are ever burdened with the badge
of self-interest.
Because the Supreme Court's jurisprudence of balancing frames most liberty
issues as individual rights claims versus the public interest, modern constitutional
theory has lost sight of the important connection between vigorous protection of
individual liberties and the pursuit of the public good. With the exception of First
Amendment jurisprudence which has continued to recognize the importance of
freedom of expression to the public dialogue of an effective democracy,' claims
of constitutionally guaranteed liberty are understood to be limits on the pursuit of
the public good and must therefore be overridden in certain circumstances.'
It has all come down to the levels of scrutiny analysis which dominates much of
today's constitutional jurisprudence.' Under this approach, the likelihood that a
claim of constitutional right will succeed depends upon who is making the claim,
the nature of the claim, and the nature of the interest asserted by the government.
20. Much of the direct impact of the New Deal regulations fell upon big business. This was also
true of most early environmental regulation which was directed at air and water pollution. More recent
environmental laws, particularly endangered species and wetlands regulations, have had significant
impacts on individual property owners.
21. Property rights legislation has been introduced in virtually every state legislature and passed in
several, usually in the fo'm of some limits on regulation or guarantees of compensation. See HERTHA
L. LUND, PROPERTY RIGmTs LEGISLATION IN THE STATES: A REvIEW (1995). Similar legislation was
also part of the Republican "Contract with America", which was introduced in the 104th Congress.
22. In addition to the Supreme Court decisions in Nollan and First Lutheran Church, several
decisions in the United States Court of Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals have
given property owners reason for optimism. See, e.g., Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d
1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
23. Justice Black stated that "there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of [the
First Amendment] was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs." Mills v. Alabama, 384
U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
24. Justice Holmes stated that "[g]ovemment could hardly go on if to some extent the values
incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law."
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
25. Level of scrutiny analysis had its origins in equal protection law. See Gerald Gunther, The
Supreme Court, 1971 Teim-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 8-10 (1972). It has since been applied in numerous
other areas of constitutional law to justify differential treatment of different rights claims.
[Vol. 50:377
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Under this rubric, property rights claimants have not fared well because they can
claim no special status on the basis of group membership, their claim of right is
"economic" and therefore of lesser significance,27 and the government is invariably
understood to be pursuing a social or economic purpose which calls for judicial
deference. 2 That the public interest might be served by the protection of property
rights is not a possibility within this analytical framework.
But secure and enforced property rights are important to the public interest.
Indeed, without a system of clearly defined and transferable property rights, public
welfare will suffer. Surely the time has passed when it can be claimed with
credulity that public or common ownership of the means of production will
necessarily serve the public interest.' The human and environmental tragedies of
eastern Europe's experience with communism should not be dismissed as the
consequences of corrupt political regimes. Although many, if not most, of the
communist regimes were corrupt by western democratic standards, their failures
(and their corruption) were ultimately rooted in the lack of adequate institutional
arrangements for the efficient allocation of scarce resources.
Adequate institutional arrangements for allocating scarce resources must reflect
the fundamental recognition that, in matters of human action, incentives matter.
With this simple understanding, one can explain the failures and successes of most
human institutions. Of course, failure and success are in the eye of the beholder,
but, for the purposes of this conversation, I assume that success is to be measured
with reference to the quality of the environment. For the sake of discussion, I will
assume further that environmental quality can be assessed - that we will agree
about when the environment is better and when it is worse.
The general presumption of modem environmental regulation is that market
failures are the cause of most environmental harm." Stated differently, the
supposition is that private property and other forms of private economic rights are
exercised by self-interested, even if well intentioned, individuals in ways which do
not take account of most environmental consequences. In the innumerable private
actions and interactions which constitute a market economy, individual actors do not
consider the impacts for third parties. In the language of economics, private actors
do not concern themselves with external costs because third parties are often not in
26. Since United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), the Supreme Court has
favored "discrete and insular minorities" on the theory that they ae unable to look after themselves in
the political process. Id. at 152 n.4. Although owners of real estate (but not of property more broadly
conceived) are a minority, it is mistakenly assumed that, as a group, they have greater rather than lesser
political power because of their property-based wealth.
27. The dichotomy between economic and personal liberties has prevailed notwithstanding
occasional objections. See, e.g., Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972) ("[T]he
dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a false one.").
28. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1439-42 (2d ed. 1988).
29. However, we do remain committed to the federal ownership of one-third of the nations' land
with vast expanses of western lands under the management of the Forest Service, the Bureau of Land
Management and other federal agencies.
30. See James L. Huffman, Protecting the Environmentfrom Orthodox Environmentalism, 15 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POLY 349, 362 (1992).
1997]
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a position to bargair for cost internalization due to high transactions costs and
inadequate information. Furthermore, markets are thought to be particularly
detrimental to the environment because of their anthropocentricity.3"
Because many of our environmental regulations are designed to overcome these
alleged shortcomings of the market, it is important to assess the validity of the
underlying assumption and the adequacy of the regulatory solutions. All of this is
relevant to private property because the regulatory solutions necessarily have
significant effects on the scope and value of property rights.
The assumption that market failure is the source of many environmental problems
is accurate to an extent. It is certainly true, for example, that many forms of
pollution constitute external costs which are not easily internalized given the
existing distribution and definition of property rights. This pollution will sometimes
have direct health effects on third parties, and will often have indirect effects for
wildlife and ecosystems. In these circumstances, regulatory efforts to internalize the
direct and indirect costs may be the best solution in terms of efficiency.
But many environmental regulations premised on market failure are really legal
system failures in the sense that a refined property rights system will permit cost
internalization through normal market processes. For example, much of what states
and municipalities have sought to accomplish through land use regulation might be
better achieved through clearer definition and enforcement of property rights
including the traditional common law principles of trespass and nuisance - better
in the sense that costs can be internalized without creating the uncertainties which
are detrimental to productive and wise resource management by private property
owners.
It has become accepted wisdom among most advocates of our existing
environmental regulations,32 as well as among the authors of most environmental
law casebooks,33 that the common law remedies for external costs have been
inadequate to cope with modem environmental problems. Trespass and nuisance are
treated as quaint remnants of an innocent past. But the case for greater reliance on
these common law remedies should not be so easily dismissed,' not least of all
because of their flexibility in representing the constantly shifting values in our
society and the ever changing understanding of the costs and benefits of human
activities which impact on the environment. This is not to say that all external costs
will be internalized if we take the law of trespass and nuisance seriously. High
transactions costs will remain a deterrent, although the plaintiffs' bar has
31. See James L. Huffman, Do Species and Nature Have Rights?, 13 PUB. LAND L. REv. 51, 58
(1992) [hereinafter Huffman, Do Species and Nature Have Rights?].
32. See, e.g., RANK GRAD ET AL., INJURIES AND DAMAGES FROM HAZARDOUS WASTES, S. REP.
No. 97-12 (1982).
33. This perspective, however, may be changing. "At the start of the environmental decade, common
law actions basically were assigned an interstitial, transitional role in the grand strategy for legal
protection of the environment. . . . Today, ... this strategy is being reevaluated." FREDERICK R.
ANDERSON ET AL, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 64 (1990).
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demonstrated the power of the class action in other situations where unaggregated,
individual harm is otherwise too small to justify market transactions or legal
action.35
But legal system failure results not only from the abandonment of the traditional
common law rights of third parties, but also from a lack of creativity in the
refinement of our private property system. Our reliance on regulation is rooted in
part in the belief that some resources cannot be owned, as a practical matter," and
therefore will not be the subject of market transactions. But what can and cannot
be owned is not unchanging. Our ability to create clear and enforceable property
rights is largely a function of technology and our conceptual capacity. Terry
Anderson and P.J. Hill demonstrated this in their study of nineteenth century
property rights in cattle and grasslands.37 We are witness to the same phenomenon
today as we explore the use of bar codes in the marketing of highway usage and
tracers in the tracking of pollution.
Perhaps a less futuristic example will better illustrate my point about legal system
failures as distinct from market failures. Consider the case of water. In England and
early American legal history, water use was allocated under the riparian water rights
system which was concerned mainly with regulating access, flow and to some extent
quality. The settlement of the American West witnessed an innovation in water
rights law in the form of the prior appropriation system which met the needs of
miners and farmers in an arid geography.39 Because these needs were met largely
by the diversion of water, more recent advocates of instream flow maintenance for
fish habitat and pollution control encountered a property rights system ill-suited to
their objectives. The almost instinctual response was to reserve available flows from
future appropriation and to impose regulations where streams were already fully
appropriated. The alternative of permitting private ownership of instream water uses
has been far slower in coming. Indeed, the general trend in western water law
seems to favor public management over allocation through private market
transactions, notwithstanding innovations in technology which can facilitate the
definition of clear and enforceable water rights.
When faced with resource allocations, including environmental impacts, which
we do not like, why do we leap to regulation and public management as the
solutions? I would posit two reasons. First, to the extent that we dislike the
35. Perhaps the most dramatic example of the power of the class action is the ongoing litigation
against, and the various proposed settlements with, the tobacco companies.
36. Even if technology and human ingenuity make it possible to design effective property rights
systems for things like air pollution and big game hunting, some will oppose the assignment of such
rights on the grounds that it is immoral to recognize rights to pollute or ownership of animals.
37. See Terry Anderson & PJ. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American
West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163, 168-78 (1975).
38. See 2 WELLS A. HUTcHINs, WATER RIGHTS LAws IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 1-43
(1974).
39. See 1 id. at 226-433.
40. See Charles F. Wilkinson, Prior Appropriation 1848-1991, 21 ENvTL. LAW v (1991) (In
Memoriam section of issue number 3).
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particular allocative result because we believe it is inefficient, by which I mean
costs and benefits have not been internalized, we may assume that the only remedy
is regulation or public management. Second, the objective may have nothing to do
with efficient resource allocation and everything to do with redistributing wealth.
Often regulation will be undertaken in the name of correcting market failure, but
the real objective will be wealth redistribution. Even where cost internalization is
the initial motivating purpose, there will be wealth distribution consequences and
powerful incentives for competing political interests to assure that those consequen-
ces are beneficial to their constituencies. Because the regulatory approach invites
the politics of wealth redistribution (or special interest politics as it is commonly
called today), and because wealth redistribution can have serious negative impacts
on wealth generation, we should reassess the assumption that regulation and public
management are the only solutions to market failure. Indeed, we should reassess the
conclusion that market failure is the cause of every external cost.
As in the water rights example above, the exclusion of some interests from
effective participation in the market results from a legal system failure in the sense
that the excluded interests are denied the possibility to hold a property interest in
their preferred use of scarce resources. Those who value the benefits of maintaining
stream flows are precluded from acquiring and holding a property interest in stream
flow preservation. Thus, they cannot acquire an irrigator's consumptive water right
and choose to leave the formerly diverted water in the stream for the benefit of the
fish. Unless the law of water rights is reformed to permit private acquisition of
instream flow rights, those who value instream uses of water will have no
alternative but to advocate regulation or public acquisition.
A second example of particular relevance in the West is the allocation to private
interests of the grazing and timber resources of the federal public lands. The fact
that these lands are owned by the public does not preclude reliance on the
efficiencies of market allocation through the competitive sale or lease of private
rights of use. Not surprisingly, those who would choose to purchase timber or lease
grazing land for the purpose of leaving the trees or grass to Mother Nature's uses
are precluded from the process. This is not surprising because these Forest Service
and Bureau of Land Management processes are a small part of the much larger
public lands management enterprise which is a classic example of resource
allocation by the politics of wealth distribution.4'
But why, you may ask, should we want to correct these legal system failures so
that markets will be able to internalize more of the costs of private resource
allocation decisions? Why not just rely on the regulatory system to internalize
costs?
We should prefer refinement of the property rights system to reliance on
regulation for the sare reason that we should prefer, in general, markets to central
planning. Markets are especially efficient allocators of resources because they
permit individuals to act upon their individual preferences and to adjust those
41. See James L. Huffinan, Public Lands Management in an Age of Deregulation and Privatization,
10 PUB. LAND L. REv. 29, 49-53 (1989).
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actions as circumstances and preferences shift over time. Central planning must rely
on less direct means for determining individual preferences and has little flexibility
as circumstances and preferences change over time.
Consider the example of instream flow protection. The failure to provide for
instream water uses imposes costs on those who value such uses but are precluded
from participating in the market because the law does not permit private acquisition
of instream flow water rights. To internalize these costs by regulation, we must
determine who values instream uses, how much they value those uses, and then
devise a rule which will provide the amount of instream use that would have been
acquired if it had been possible through private transactions.
The regulator is effectively seeking to mimic the market place. But why mimic
the market place if market failures can be avoided by legal system corrections? If
we believe that central planners can determine the optimal allocation of water as
well as or better than a market allocation free of external costs, then we should be
prepared to rely upon those planners for all of our scarce resource allocation. The
recent experiences of several planned economies should dissuade us from this
conclusion.
We also should be cautious about relying heavily on regulation to internalize
costs because of the temptations of wealth redistribution through the regulatory
process. Notwithstanding good intentions to internalize costs in the name of
efficient resource allocation, opportunities for wealth redistribution abound.
Regulation in the name of pollution control can easily become protectionist
legislation for a particular industry or segment of industry. Regulation in the name
of controlling urban sprawl can become the route to increased real estate values for
owners of unrestricted property. The prospect that politics will turn cost inter-
nalization into wealth redistribution does not argue against regulation in every
circumstance. But it does underscore the advantage of looking to improved rights
definition as the better method of cost internalization.
Of course, advocates of environmental regulation may contend that their policy
objectives have nothing to do with efficient resource allocation and cost inter-
nalization. They may be interested in the rights of future generations, or in the
rights of other living organisms, or in the morality of human impact on natural
ecosystems. What, if anything, will private property rights do to promote these
visions of the public interest? Or are regulation and public management the only
alternatives?
If our concern is for the rights of future generations, the challenge we face is not
different in kind from that which confronts us in efficiently allocating scarce
resources among the living. I assume that a concern for future generations is rooted
in the belief that the unborn have equal rights with the living - equal in the sense
of opportunity to achieve their human potential with the benefit of the earth's
bounty. Future generations are disadvantaged by being absent and thus not party to
the resource allocation decisions we make today. This is true whether resources are
allocated through private actions and transactions in a market or through some form
of public decision making. In either case the question is how will the rights and
interests of future generations be best represented. While it is widely assumed and
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asserted that future generations will only be represented through the political
process, the evidence is not so clear.
Private actors do take account of future generations in important ways. Parents
are concerned for their children and grandparents for their grandchildren. They
conserve to assure opportunities for their progeny even unknown. But it is not only
family ties which bind us to future generations. As resources become less abundant,
individuals have growing incentives to conserve for unknown and unrelated future
generations. The derision to use today or save for tomorrow depends upon an
assessment of present and discounted future values. If the discounted future value
of a resource is greater than its present value, it will be saved in anticipation of
realizing that future value. And when the future arrives, it is not necessary to "use"
the resource to realize its value. It can be sold or otherwise transferred to another
individual who might also choose to conserve in anticipation of greater future
benefits.
Even where the individual property owner chooses current use or consumption
over conservation, it may well serve the interests of future generations who are the
beneficiaries of all that the current generation reaps, whether costs or benefits.
Throughout human history the quality of life and the scope of human opportunity
have grown. Perhaps the latter day Malthusians will yet see their visions of
catastrophe realized, but most of human history provides little support for their
doomsday prophesies. What evidence there is for an approaching environmental
apocalypse is more the product of central planning than it is of private market
transactions. Eastern Europe offers the best (or should I say worst) examples,
although the United States has its share of government subsidized and managed
environmental catastrophes.
Regulation and public management often fail to consider the interests and rights
of future generations because the unborn hold no sway in the political process. They
do not vote nor do their future votes have any discounted present value.42 Living
voters will bring their concern for their progeny to politics as well as to private
decisions, but in a representative democracy they will have difficulty persuading
their representatives to think beyond the next election. As those who invest in
political campaigns will attest, political capital does not hold its value for long.
This is not to say that future generations will not value and appreciate what our
governments do in their name today. They will, and they won't, depending upon
how well we have anticipated their needs and values. But the political reality is that
we will do little in the name of future generations which does not also serve the
interests of current participants in the political process. It is often suggested that the
early National Parks are evidence of what one generation can do for those who
follow, but there is persuasive evidence that the economic interests of the railroads
had as much to do with the creation of Yellowstone, Glacier, Yosemite, Rocky
Mountain and other early parks as did any concern about posterity.43 And creating
42. See PETER MENELL & RICHARD STEWART, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 90 (1994).
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the parks is only a small part of preserving them for future generations. The record
of public management in our national parks, like on most of our public lands, has
often failed from the perspective of later generations as evidenced by the many
lawsuits and administrative challenges filed against the federal government by
environmental groups.'
It is clear that regulation and public management are not always preferable to
private property in the allocation of scarce resources to the uses of future
generations. It is equally clear that non-human organisms and ecosystems do not
necessarily fare better under political management than under private control. The
incentives faced by public and private managers are largely a function of
institutional arrangements and are thus affected little by abstract statements of
purpose. Like other appeals in the name of the public interest, assertions of non-
human rights and of biocentric morality do little to influence the long term behavior
of human decision makers, whether public or private. Non-human rights claims are
dependent upon human representation and will therefore reflect the interests of self-
appointed, human agents.45 Policy prescriptions in the name of biocentric morality
are an even more audacious effort to raise one's personal interests to a moral high
ground.
Much more could be said about the last two bases for disfavoring property rights
in the allocation of scarce resources. But suffice to say that human nature being
what it is, our resource allocation institutions must be based upon an understanding
of the basic premise that incentives matter. No amount of preaching or teaching will
change this reality, so we should focus our attention on understanding the
institutions we have and adjusting them to better deliver the results we desire.
The institution of private property rights gets the incentives right in the sense that
it has the theoretical capacity to internalize all of the costs and benefits of resource
use. While it is true that this theoretical capacity is never fully realized, we should
not be too quick to abandon private property for a regulatory approach which all to
often gets the incentives wrong. In our search for better institutional arrangements,
ones which get the incentives right, we must avoid abandoning the good in search
of the perfect.
Private property has resulted in resource allocations which are detrimental to the
environment. So have public management and regulation. The question we should
ask ourselves is which approach best serves the public interest in both resource
allocation and wealth distribution. Private property is not the perfect solution, but
it does permit markets to function effectively and it does protect existing
distributions of wealth. Markets supported by a good property rights system are
very effective at insuring that resources are allocated to their highest valued use.
They do this by providing incentives for the generation of good information about
alternative uses and about the consequences (both costs and benefits) of those uses.
44. For critical examinations of National Parks management, see generally ALSTON CHASE, PLAYING
GOD IN YELLOWSTONE (1986), and KARL HESS, ROCKY TIMES IN ROCKY MOUNTAIN NATIONAL PARK
(1993).
45. See Huffman, Do Species and Nature Have Rights?, supra note 31, at 75.
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These allocational results are surely within anyone's definition of the public
interest. All other things equal, is there anyone who would prefer inefficient
allocation of scarce resources? Protection of existing distributions of legally
acquired wealth must also come within most conceptions of the public interest. This
is not to say that there is not a public interest in additional values, nor to deny that
public management and regulation can also serve the public interest. Rather, my
point is that there is a public interest in maintaining and improving a system of
private property rights. It will promote efficient resource use; it will protect legal
entitlements from arbitrary government interference; it will provide an essential
foundation to the securing of all liberties. And, contrary to the assumption of most
orthodox environmentalists, the public interest in a clean environment will often be
best served by private management of scarce resources in a well designed system
of private property rghts.
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